We demonstrate that capital gains tax changes inversely affect stock return volatility. A capital gains tax cut reduces the risk sharing between investors and the government and increases stock return volatility. The tax effect on return volatility also differs depending upon the characteristics of stocks such as dividend distribution and embedded capital gains and losses. Using the Tax Relief Act of 1997, we empirically show that the return volatility of the market index and industry portfolios increases after the capital gains tax cut. Furthermore, non-or lower dividend-paying stocks experience larger increase in return volatility than higher dividend-paying stocks and stocks with large embedded capital losses see larger increases in return volatility than stocks with small embedded capital losses.
Introduction
This paper examines the effect of capital gains taxes on asset return volatility.
Existing studies on the effects of capital gains taxes on asset prices have primarily focused on the level of asset returns and on trading volume. The goal of this study is to investigate the relation between asset return volatility and capital gains taxes. We demonstrate that imposing capital gains taxes reduces asset return volatility because the government shares the gains and losses in assets held by investors subject to taxation upon realization. Our analysis relies on the role of financial markets in facilitating risk sharing between investors and the government in the presence of capital gains taxes. A capital gains tax rate cut reduces risk sharing between investors and the government and has an adverse effect on individual investors' consumption smoothing. This leads to a more volatile individual consumption growth rate and stochastic discount factor, resulting in a higher asset return volatility. Using the Tax Relief Act of 1997, we uncover strong evidence that a capital gains tax rate cut significantly increases the volatility of asset returns and the magnitude of increases in return volatility differs depending upon the characteristics of assets such as dividend distribution and embedded capital losses and gains. To our knowledge, this is the first study of the relation between asset return volatility and the capital gains taxes.
There is an increasing literature about how capital gains taxes affect asset prices.
Existing theoretical studies suggest that the effect of capital gains taxes on asset price is likely to be ambiguous because introducing capital gains taxes decreases both the demand and the supply of assets. Empirical investigations on the effect of capital gains taxes have produced conflicting results. Several studies (Lang and Shackelford (2000) , Ayers, Lefanowicz, and Robinson (2003) , among others) report that the presence of capital gains taxes reduced stock price and current stock return, while other studies document that imposing capital gains taxes increases stock price and current stock return (Feldstein, Slemrod, and Yitzhaki (1980) , Reese (1998) , Klein (2001) , Jin (2005) , among others).
Further, Dhaliwal and Li (2006) investigate the relation between investor tax heterogeneity and ex-dividend day trading volume and document a concave relation between ex-dividend day trading volume and investor tax heterogeneity measured by institutional ownership. In a recent study, Dai, Maydew, Shackelford, and Zhang (2007) investigate the effect of capital gains taxes on asset price and trading volume by jointly considering the impact on demand and supply of assets. Using the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 as the event, they find that stock returns are higher in anticipation of a tax cut and stocks with large embedded capital gains and high tax sensitive investor ownership experience a lower return after the lower tax rate became effective. They also document that a capital gains tax cut increases the trading volume the week before and immediately after the tax cut announcement.
However, none of the existing studies has examined the relation between asset return volatility and capital gains taxes. Asset return volatility is one of the key determinants of investors' demand and supply of risky assets. If the presence of capital gains taxes affects asset return volatility, it will certainly impact investors' demand and supply of risky assets and ultimately influence asset returns. In this paper, we first discuss the relation between the capital gains taxes and asset return volatility focusing on the risk sharing role of the capital gains taxes between investors and the government. Based on our analysis, we develop hypotheses on the relation between the capital gains taxes and asset return volatility. We then empirically test the predictions using the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 as our event.
Overall, our analysis suggests the following testable implications when the capital gains tax rate is reduced.
• Return volatility is increased for the market index and industrial portfolios.
• Non-or lower dividend-paying stocks will experience higher volatility increase than higher dividend-paying stocks.
• Stocks with large embedded capital losses (gains) will have higher volatility increase than stocks with small embedded capital losses (gains).
The first prediction focuses on the effect of a capital gains tax rate cut on the return volatility of portfolios and the market index. Thus, it represents the effect of a capital gains tax rate cut on the volatility of the broad financial market. The next two predictions focus on the effect of a capital gains tax rate cut on individual stock return volatility and constitute the cross-sectional implications of a capital gains tax rate cut on stock return volatility.
Our predictions are closely related to the roles played by the financial markets.
From investors' perspective, financial markets have two important functions: risk sharing and consumption smoothing. In addition to actively sharing risk with other market participants, in the presence of the capital gains taxes, investors also share the risk of holding risky stocks with the government (passively). This is clearly exemplified when the investors' asset holdings have depreciated in value. In this case, the investors' net losses are less than the decrease in the market value of the asset because a fraction of the loss is borne by the government in the form of reduced capital gains taxes or even tax rebate from the government. When the capital gains tax rate is cut, risk sharing between investors and the government is reduced. Investors thus experience more volatile consumption growth rates resulting in increased volatility for the stochastic discount factor. This then leads to an increase in stock return volatility.
Because the risk sharing role associated with the capital gains taxes varies with stocks with different characteristics, the impact of a capital gains tax change on stock return volatility also differs correspondingly. Specifically, the capital gains tax change matters to the extent that investors anticipate the capital gains tax rate change affecting future returns. For example, suppose investors receive all returns as dividends, then capital gains taxes are irrelevant and changes in the capital gains tax should have no impact on risk or return volatility. Conversely, if all future returns are expected to be taxed at the new capital gains tax rate, then we will expect the rate change to substantially increase risk and return volatility. In our tests, we assume that firms will maintain their current dividend policy. Thus, we predict that, ceteris paribus, non-and lower dividendpaying stocks are riskier and will experience larger increases in return volatility than higher dividend-paying stocks after the capital gains tax rate is reduced.
Similarly, stocks with large embedded capital gains and losses are likely to trigger larger capital gains and losses when investors sell than stocks with little or no appreciation or depreciation. Thus, we expect that stocks with large, embedded capital gains and loses become riskier when the capital gains tax rate is lower because there is less risk sharing with the government. Therefore, we predict that these stocks will experience higher volatility increases.
Our empirical analysis on stock return volatility surrounding the 1997 capital gains tax rate cut provides strong support for our predictions on the effect of the capital gains tax change on stock return volatility using data between January 1993 and December 2002. For the market portfolio, we find the volatility of monthly excess return of the value-weighted CRSP stocks is more than 3.4 percentage points higher when the capital gains tax rate for individual investors is reduced from 28 percent to 20 percent, after controlling for several variables which are widely documented to be important determinants of stock return volatility and the state of the economy. Consistent with the finding on realized market volatility, the monthly implied volatility for the Standard & Poors index options (VIX) is also increased by 2.8 percentage points after the capital gains tax cut, controlling for the same set of variables. For our entire sample period, the average monthly volatility is 4.3 percent for the excess returns of the value-weighted CRSP stocks and 5.9 percent for the implied volatility for the Standard and Poors index options. Further, for five industry portfolios formed based on 4-digit SIC code including consumer industry, manufacturing industry, high tech industry, healthcare industry, and other industries, the monthly return volatility is higher for all five portfolios when the capital gains tax rate is reduced, controlling for variables often identified to be important factors affecting return volatility. The increase in monthly return volatility ranges from 2.2 percentage points for the healthcare industry to 4.6 percentage points for the high tech industry. In the meantime, the average monthly return volatility for the time period is 5.2 percent for the healthcare industry and 6.9 percent for the high tech industry. In addition, the increase in return volatility for all five industries is statistically significant.
For the cross-sectional implications of a capital gains tax cut on stock returns, we construct portfolios based on a firm's dividend distribution and embedded capital gains or losses. We find that non-dividend paying stocks experience higher volatility increase than dividend-paying stocks, consistent with the prediction of our analysis. Specifically, nondividend paying stocks experience 1.7 percentage points higher monthly return volatility than dividend-paying stocks, on average, after controlling for variables widely documented to be important determinants of stock return volatility, the state of the economy, and variables specific to the portfolios such as the debt-asset ratio, turnover, percentage bid-ask spread, and the growth option. Further, we find that stocks with large embedded capital losses (with losses in the upper 25 percentile) experience 3.3 percentage points higher monthly return volatility increase than stocks with small embedded capital losses (with losses in the lower 25 percentile). For stocks with embedded capital gains, we find that the monthly return volatility increase is 1.4 percentage points higher for stocks with large embedded gains (with gains in the upper 25 percentile) than for stocks with small embedded gains (with gains in the lower 25 percentile).
It is worth noting that the stock return volatility increase associated with a capital gains tax cut does not necessarily imply that investors are worse off when the capital gains tax rate is lower. This is because a capital gains tax cut may increase the after-tax stock return. Consequently, investors may experience the same or improved return and risk trade-off and thus face the same or better investment opportunities.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we discuss the mechanism that the capital gains taxes affect stock return volatility and develop hypotheses on the effects of a capital gains tax cut on return volatility both for market index and industry portfolios and the cross-section of individual stocks. Section 3 presents empirical methodology to test the predictions of our analysis. Section 4 discusses the results of the empirical analysis.
Conclusion remarks are provided in Section 5.
Capital Gains Taxes and Stock Return Volatility
Financial markets and the financial assets traded in those markets serve two important roles for investors: consumption smoothing and risk sharing. Some individuals earn more than they currently wish to spend, while others spend more than they currently earn. Trading in financial assets allows these individuals to shift their purchasing power from high-earnings periods to low-earnings periods of life by buying financial assets in high-earning periods and selling these assets to fund their consumption needs in lowearning periods. Financial markets and the financial assets also allow investors to allocate risks among themselves so that risk in their portfolio is commensurate with the return to the portfolio, i.e., investors with high risk tolerance hold riskier assets such as stocks and those with low risk tolerance hold more less risky assets such as money market instruments. In an economy without government taxation, consumption smoothing and risk sharing are achieved among market participants through trading of financial assets on financial markets.
In the presence of taxation, the government, however, plays an important role in influencing the consumption smoothing and risk sharing among market participants.
Capital gains taxes in particular have a large impact on consumption smoothing and risk sharing of investors participating in the financial markets and financial asset trading. In the United States, capital gains taxes are levied upon selling an asset based on the appreciation or depreciation on the asset. Specifically, in the case of common stocks, if a stock has appreciated in value, the investor pays capital gains taxes on the appreciation upon selling. On the other hand, if the stock has depreciated in value upon selling, the investor can use the realized losses to offset realized gains on other assets. If the realized losses exceed the realized gains, the losses can be used to reduce the taxable ordinary income up to a limit with the remaining losses carried forward to offset future gains and ordinary income.
1 The tax treatment of the gains and losses on stocks thus offers a risk sharing mechanism between investors and the government. Consequently, the capital gains taxes will affect the consumption smoothing of stock market participants.
The risk sharing between investors and the government associated with the capital gains taxes will ultimately affect the stock return volatility. Under no arbitrage condition, Harrison and Kreps (1979) demonstrate that there exist stochastic discount factors that can be used to price the stochastic payoffs associated with any assets. Subsequently studies have suggested that the stochastic discount factors (or pricing kernels) can take different specifications depending upon investors' preferences, consumption profiles, and various forms of market frictions, among others. In particular, recent studies suggest that the consumption growth rate of stock market participants is an important determinant of 1 Individuals, the only investors affected by the reduction in the capital gains tax rate studied in this paper, face no limit on the amount of capital losses that they can use to offset capital gains. If capital losses remain after offsetting all capital gains, then individuals can apply up to $3,000 of capital losses against ordinary income. In practice, this constraint is rarely binding (Poterba [1987] and Auerbach, Burman and Siegel [2000] ). The Internal Revenue Service [1999a, 1999b] reports that in the year of the capital gains rate reduction (1997), individuals in the maximum tax bracket (39.6 percent), who accounted for 61 percent of all net capital gains, reported $169 billion of long-term capital gains and only $5 billion of long-term capital losses and $16 billion of short-term capital gains and only $8 billion of short-term capital losses. In short, individual investors had far more capital gains than they had capital losses to offset them. Thus, for our purposes, it is reasonable to assume that realized capital losses can be used to offset realized capital gains.
stochastic discount factors (Mankiw and Zeldes, 1991 , Jacobs, 1999 , and Brav, Constantinides, and Geczy, 2002 . In general, these studies document that the stochastic discount factor using the more volatile consumption growth rates for stockholders explains the volatile stock returns better than the aggregate consumption growth rate. This suggests a positive relation between the volatility of the consumption growth rate and the stock return volatility. Because the capital gains taxes affect the risk sharing between investors and the government and the consumption smoothing of stock market participants, the change in the capital gains taxes will impact the volatility of the consumption growth rates of these investors and consequently the stock return volatility.
To facilitate the development of our hypotheses on the relation between the capital gains taxes and stock return volatility, we focus on some extreme cases and then offer insights on general situations. We start with the effect of the capital gains taxes on the broad financial market and then discuss the cross-sectional implications of a change in the capital gains taxes on individual stock return volatility. Our discussions above suggest that the government serves as a partner in sharing the return of stock investments with the taxable investor partner in the presence of the capital gains taxes. Suppose the capital gains tax rate is close to 100 percent. The government "partner" thus gets almost all the returns of investments made by taxable investors. Consequently, it bears almost all the risk while the risk borne by taxable investors is negligible. On the other hand, suppose that the capital gains tax rate is 0. Then the taxable investor "partner" receives all the returns and bears all the risk. In reality, the capital gains tax rate is typically positive but well below 100 percent. When the capital gains tax rate increases, the government "partner" receives a larger fraction of the return and bears more risk. The taxable investor "partner" receives a lower fraction of the return and bears less risk. When the capital gains tax rate is reduced, however, the government "partner" gets a smaller fraction of the return and bears less risk while the taxable investor "partner" receives a larger fraction of the return and bears more risk. Because capital gains taxes apply to all stocks, in the case of a capital gains tax cut, taxable investors will receive a larger fraction of returns on all stocks and bears more risk on all the stocks, leading to a more volatile consumption growth rates for these investors. As a result, we have the following hypothesis on the relation between the capital gains taxes and the return volatility for the broad stock market. In the next section, we discuss empirical methodology to test three hypotheses discussed above.
H1:

Empirical Methodology
To empirically test the effect on stock return volatility of a change in the capital gains tax rate, we use the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 (TRA97) as our event. The TRA97 lowered the top tax rate on capital gains for individual investors from 28 percent to 20 percent for assets held more than 18 months. TRA97 is particularly attractive for an event study because the capital gains tax cut was large and relatively unexpected, and the bill included few other changes that might confound our analysis. Often U.S. tax legislation follows a protracted process with gradual changes in the probability of a particular bill becoming a law. In TRA97, however, Congress provided researchers with an attractive setting by coming to rapid agreement on a large, relatively unexpected reduction in capital gains tax rates. The empirical implications we derived above apply not only to the broad financial market, they also apply to the cross-section of stocks with certain characteristics. In our empirical analysis, we first examine return volatility at market level using the value-weighted market index and the implied volatility of Standard & Poors index options (VIX), we then move down to industry level using five industry portfolios (consumer, manufacturing, high tech, health, and others), classified based on 4-digit SIC code, and finally we examine return volatility of stock portfolios constructed based on a firm's dividend distribution in the prior year and embedded capital gains (losses) in the past 18 months.
2 Specifically, to test the hypothesis on the effect of a capital gains tax cut on the return volatility of non-or lower dividend-paying stocks relative to the dividend and high dividend-paying stocks, we construct the non-dividend paying portfolio and the dividend-paying portfolio based on a firm's dividend distribution in the prior year. For the dividend-paying portfolio, we further form low dividend yield portfolio and high dividend yield portfolio using the median dividend yield at each month as a threshold. To mitigate the confounding effect on return volatility associated with capital gains tax cut on stocks with large price changes, on this hypothesis test we restrict our attention to stocks with share price changes (either positive or negative) to be less than 5 percent in the past 18 months from the current month. Next, to test the hypothesis on the effect of a capital gains tax cut on the return volatility of firms with large embedded capital gains or losses versus small embedded gains or losses, we form four quartile (25 percentile) portfolios for non-dividend paying stocks with price appreciation (positive price change)
in the past 18 months, called gains portfolios, and four quartile portfolios for nondividend paying stocks with price depreciation (negative price change) in the past 18 months, called losses portfolios We choose to focus on non-dividend paying stocks to mitigate the confounding effect on stock return volatility from a firm's dividend distribution. At each level, we use daily returns to construct monthly volatility measure.
The sampling period used in our empirical analysis spans from January 1993 to 
where tj r is the market excess return on day j of month t and The research design we use to test our hypotheses on the change in stock return volatility in response to the capital gains tax cut is to define a dummy variable t Post which takes value 0 on and before 3/31/1997 and value 1 on and after 6/1/1997. Note that this is different from standard event study on stock returns which focuses on announcement effect. We actually take out those event months from our examination because we are interested in the change of volatility level before and after the event.
Another important difference between stock return and the volatility of stock return is that the latter has significant persistence which may cause problems in the statistical inference if not appropriately accounted for. To allow for the serial correlation in stock return volatility, we use lagged demeaned volatility as explanatory variable in our analysis.
Specifically, the specification we use for market index and the implied volatility index for the Standard & Poors index options (VIX) is:
where
is the demeaned volatility measure for the market index (or the implied volatility index), subscript j refers to its lags, and subscript k refers to the months.
Existing empirical asset pricing studies suggest that large negative stock price changes tend to be followed by periods of high stock return volatility. In other words, stock return volatility is asymmetric in stock return performance. This is sometimes referred to as the leverage effect. To account for this effect, we allow stock return volatility to depend on lagged stock returns ( j t r − ). Finally, t X refers to a vector of aggregate control variables.
In our regression analysis the aggregate control variables include the consumption-wealth ratio (CAY), the stochastically detrended risk free rate (RREL), and the industrial production growth rate (GIP). Based on the capital asset pricing theory, Lettau and Ludvigson (2001) propose that the consumption-wealth ratio be used as a determinant for stock returns. They further demonstrate that the CAY variable is a better predictor than the dividend yield, the term premium, the default premium, and other previously widely used predictors combined. Campbell and Shiller (1988) document that the stochastically detrended risk free rate is an important predictor for stock returns. We also include the growth rate of the industrial production to account for the state of the economic activities.
For each industry portfolios i, we use the following specification:
Note that, in addition to the explanatory variables included in the specification for the market index and the implied volatility of index options, we have also included lagged demeaned industry portfolio volatility (
) and lagged industry portfolio returns ( ) ( j t i r − ) to account for volatility persistence and leverage effect at industry level.
For both the market index and industry portfolios, our discussions suggest that the return volatility will be higher after the capital gains tax rate is cut. This implies that the estimated coefficient for Post is positive, i.e., . 0 > β For portfolios constructed based on a firm's dividend distribution and embedded capital gains or losses, we consider the following model on the monthly return volatility of portfolio i:
Similar to the specification for the industry portfolios, we include lagged demeaned portfolio volatility and lagged portfolio returns to account for possible return persistence and leverage effect at portfolio level, in addition to all the control variables we use in the equation for the return volatility of the market index. We have also included a vector of it Z which consists of portfolio-specific characteristics as of time t. These portfolio specific control variables include the value weighted averages of firms' debtasset ratios, turnover, percentage bid-ask spread, and proxy for firm's growth potential.
On the return volatility of stock portfolios constructed above, our discussions suggest that portfolios of non-or lower dividend-paying stocks and portfolios with large embedded capital gains or losses will likely experience increased return volatility after the capital gains tax cut. For these portfolios, the estimated coefficient for the dummy variable Post will likely be positive, i.e., . 0 > β However, for portfolios of high dividendpaying stocks or portfolios of stocks with small embedded gains or losses, a capital gains tax cut may have a negligible effect on the return volatility of these portfolios. The estimated coefficient for the dummy variable Post on these portfolios may be insignificant.
To test the cross-sectional implications stated in hypotheses 2 and 3, we need to compare the return volatility increases for different portfolios. For ease of exposition, we introduce the following notations. Denote by subscript "b" the benchmark portfolio and subscript "h" an alternative portfolio with possibly larger return volatility increase under the hypothesis. Let "HVP" (or High Volatility Portfolio) be a dummy variable which takes value of zero if an observation belongs to the benchmark portfolio and one otherwise, "BP" be a dummy variable representing the benchmark portfolio so that "BP = 1-HVP." We also expand the variables used in the regression analysis for a single portfolio case by stacking the observations for the two portfolios with the observations for the benchmark portfolio on the bottom. For example, we have now
representing the expanded return volatility (the dependent variable) for two portfolios,
representing the portfolio specific control variables for two portfolios.
We use the following model to test hypotheses 2 and 3 stated in the previous section: Unfortunately our measure of tax-sensitive investors using individual stock ownership is flawed. First, the returns on many institutional holdings are subject to the individual income tax (e.g., street name holdings by brokerage houses on behalf of individual investors). Thus, we measure tax-sensitive investors with measurement errors.
Second, Gompers and Metrick (2001) and Xu and Malkiel (2003) document that institutional ownership increases idiosyncratic volatility. Since they find a positive correlation between institutional ownership and volatility and we predict a negative relation, our tests are biased against rejecting the null. (Note that the null is that there is no relation between institutional ownership and volatility, while we predict that volatility will rise with the number of investors in the firm affected by the legislation). Thus, if we reject the null hypothesis, this will provide strong evidence that the 1997 rate reduction increased volativity. Conversely, we may fail to reject the null because our tests lack sufficient power to discriminate between the extant finding and our prediction.
Empirical Analysis
Sample and Summary Statistics
To empirically test the effect of TRA97 on stock return volatility, we use all stocks included in the CRSP data base. The excess return on the market index is constructed as the market return of the value-weighted portfolio of stocks included in the CRSP data base after the risk free rate is subtracted. The monthly implied volatility index for the Standard & Poors index options (VIX) is the average implied annualized volatility for different call and put options on the index with expiration date in a month. The five industry portfolios are formed using the 4-digit SIC code and consist of (1) consumer industry (consumer durables, non-durables, wholesale, retail, and some services such as laundries, repair shops), (2) manufacturing industry (manufacturing, energy, and utilities), (3) high tech industry (business equipment, telephone and television transmission), (4) health care industry (healthcare, medical equipment, and drugs), and (5) other industries (mines, construction, building materials, transportation, hotels, business services, entertainment, finance). 6 We construct monthly excess returns and volatility for non-dividend paying and dividend-paying portfolios, low dividend yield and high dividend yield portfolios, quartile gains portfolios, and quartile losses portfolios as discussed in the previous section. These are value-weighted portfolios using daily individual stock return data. 7 We use the sample from January 1993 to December 2002 for our empirical analysis. We choose the sample period based on two considerations.
First, we want to avoid the confounding effects from the tax policy changes both prior and after the TRA97. Second, we want to choose the sample period so that we have about the same observations before and after the announcement. In other words, the event months fall in the middle of our sample period.
For the aggregate control variables, we obtain the consumption-wealth ratio (CAY) from Martin Lettau's website. Since the consumption-wealth ratio is at quarterly frequency, we use linear interpolation to obtain monthly observations. The stochastically detrended risk free rate is constructed by removing the average risk free rate in the prior twelve months from the risk free rate in month t as in Campbell and Shiller (1988) . The growth rate of the industrial production is calculated using the monthly industrial production index obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
We obtain daily individual stock return data from the daily CRSP data base.
Dividend and stock price are extracted from the monthly CRSP data base. We compute a firm's dividend yield based on dividend distribution in the prior year and the stock price in the most recent month. We construct the embedded capital gains and losses using a firm's most recent 18 month stock price change prior to month t. We perform robustness check using the past 12 month and 24 month price changes to calculate the measure of the embedded capital gains and losses (results are qualitatively unaltered). To obtain measures of investor ownership, we use institutional investors' ownership information from Form 13F submitted to the Security Exchanges Commission by investment management companies. 8 We compute the individual investor ownership on stock i at time t (IND it ) as follows:
IND it = 1 -Percentage of shares owned by institutional investors at time t.
We compute a firm's debt-asset ratio using data from the COMPUSTAT data base. Because the COMPUSTAT data base is only available at quarterly frequency, we assume that a firm's debt-asset ratio remains the same within the quarter. The univariate test results in Panel B suggest that both the market and industry portfolios have experienced significant return volatility increase. Specifically, the monthly average of return volatility for the market portfolio increases from 2.7 percent before the capital gains tax rate cut to 5.5 percent after the capital gains tax rate cut.
Similarly, the implied volatility also increases from 4.2 percent to 7.3 percent. For industry portfolios, the monthly average of return volatility increases the least for manufacturing industry from 2.2 percent to 4.4 percent and the most for the high technology industry from 3.9 percent to 9.1 percent. Table 2 Overall, the results on the gains and losses portfolios provide empirical evidence that higher return is associated with higher risk. Table 3 presents the summary statistics for portfolio control variables including the value-weighted averages of firms' debt-to-asset ratio (D/A), turnover (Turnover), percentage bid and ask spread (BidAskSpread), and forecasted operating income growth rate (GrowthOption). Panel A reports the summary statistics for the non-dividend and dividend paying portfolios. The non-dividend paying portfolio has a lower average debt/asset ratio (D/A=0.49) than dividend-paying portfolios (0.64 for the portfolio of all dividend-paying stocks, 0.60 for low yield portfolio and 0.69 for high yield portfolio) with a higher standard deviation. This is consistent with some dividend-paying firms utilizing more debt financing to gain tax benefit associated with issue debt. The nondividend paying portfolio also has a much higher average turnover (16.1 percent) than dividend-paying portfolios (6.3 percent for all dividend-paying stocks, 7.1 percent for low yield portfolio and 5.7 percent for high yield portfolio). Panels B and C show the 
Tax effect on return volatility of market index and industry portfolios
We begin our discussion on the effect of a capital gains tax cut on stock return volatility by first examining the market excess return, the implied volatility index, and the return on five industry portfolios including the consumer industry, the manufacturing industry, the high tech industry, the healthcare industry, and other industries. Table 4 reports the regression results of equation (3) (2)), and the results of equation (4) on the return volatility of five industry portfolios (columns (3) to (7)).
Consistent with the prediction of our analysis, the volatility of the market excess return is higher after the capital gains tax rate is reduced. Specifically, ceteris paribus, the monthly volatility of the market excess return is 3.4 percentage points higher after the capital gains tax cut than before the capital gains tax cut (see column (1)). This finding is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The 3.4 percentage point increase also is economically significant. It exceeds the pre-TRA97 monthly average of return volatility for the market portfolio of 2.7 and accounts for most of the difference between the pre-TRA97 of 2.7 and the post-TRA97 average of 5.5 (see Table 1 , Panel B).
For our control variables, the lagged consumption-wealth ratio (CAY) has a significant positive effect on the market volatility. The lagged market excess return has a negative and significant effect on the return volatility. This is consistent with the leverage effect which states that return volatility is related to the level of returns. This negative relation also suggests that return volatility is higher when stock market performs poorly (asymmetric return volatility). Consistent with the finding on the realized market excess return volatility, the implied volatility for the S&P index options is also higher by 2.8 percentage points and highly significant after controlling for lagged demeaned volatility index and variables on the state of the economy (see column (2)). This estimate also is economically significant. The 2.8 percentage point increase is ⅔ of the pre-TRA97 mean implied volatility for the S&P index options of 4.1 and accounts for most of the difference between the pre-TRA97 of 4.1 and the post-TRA97 average of 7.3 (see Table   1 , Panel B). For the five industry portfolios, the estimated coefficient for the dummy variable is consistently positive indicating that the return volatility is higher after the capital gains tax cut. Specifically, the monthly return volatility is higher by 2.7
percentage points for the consumer industry, 2.5 percentage points for the manufacturing industry, 4.6 percentage points for the high tech industry, 2.2 percentage points for the healthcare industry, and 3.4 percentage points for all other industries after the capital gains tax cut than before the capital gains tax cut. The volatility increase is highly statistically significant for four (consumer, manufacturing, high tech, and other industries) out of five industries with a p-value less than 1 percent. For the healthcare industry, the volatility increase is significant at the 5 percent test level. The lagged consumption-wealth ratio has a significant effect on the monthly return volatility for the consumer, high tech, and the other industries at the 5 percent test level. The coefficient estimates for lagged industry returns Our results on the effect of the capital gains tax cut on the volatility of market excess return, the implied volatility of S&P index options, and the volatility of industry portfolio returns provide empirical support for the prediction that stock return volatility increases after the capital gains tax rate is reduced. Our findings are consistent with the explanation that a capital gains tax cut reduces the risk-sharing function of financial markets and increases stock return volatility.
The cross-sectional effect of a tax cut on return volatility
Different firms have different tax liabilities (both current and possible future liabilities) and offer different risk-sharing opportunities. When the capital gains tax rate changes, investors respond differently depending upon firms' characteristics. This leads to different tax effects on the return volatility of stocks with different characteristics. As our discussions above show, while the market and industry portfolios experience increases in their return volatility due to the reduced risk-sharing associated with the capital gains tax cut, the increase in volatility should be larger if the firm pays no dividend and greater if the firm has large embedded capital gains or losses. To test the cross-sectional effect of a capital gains tax change on stock return volatility, we perform regression analysis on the portfolios formed based on firm's dividend distribution in the prior year and the embedded capital gains or losses in the past 18 months using equations (5) and (6). Table 5 reports the results of the regression analysis on the non-dividend paying, dividend-paying stocks, low dividend yield, and high dividend yield portfolios. For all portfolios the estimated coefficient for the Post dummy variable is positive and statistically significant at 1 percent level. Specifically, the non-dividend paying portfolio experiences a 3.5 percentage points higher volatility increases after the capital gains tax cut than before the tax cut. The increase in return volatility is lower at 2.4 percentage points for all dividend-paying stocks. Consistent with our prediction and the empirical result on the volatility increase for non-dividend paying and dividend-paying portfolios, low dividend yield portfolio experiences a higher volatility increase (2.5) than the high dividend yield portfolio does (2.1). Both the non-dividend paying and dividend-paying portfolios exhibit asymmetric return volatility as the coefficient estimates for lagged portfolio returns Table 6 presents the results of the regression analysis on the loss portfolios. The estimated coefficients for the Post dummy are positive in all four quartile loss portfolios, consistent with a higher return volatility after the capital gains tax cut than before the tax cut. Furthermore, as predicted above, the increase in return volatility is smallest for the portfolio with the smallest losses and largest for the portfolio with the largest losses.
Specifically, the return volatility rises from 2.0 percentage points higher for the portfolio with the smallest losses to 3.5 percentage points higher for the next quartile to 4.5 percentage points higher for the next largest quartile to 5.3 percentage points higher for the portfolio with the largest losses. All coefficient estimates are significant (one percent level), except for the portfolio with the smallest losses. The probability that the quartile estimates would increase monotonically with the size of the losses by chance is less than five percent. Looking at the other coefficient estimates, a negative coefficient estimate Inferences are similar when we review Table 7 , which provides the results of the regression analysis on the gains portfolios. For all four gains portfolios, the estimated coefficient for the Post dummy variable is positive indicating a higher return volatility after the capital gains tax cut. As with the embedded losses in Table 6 , the increase in return volatility increases with the size of the embedded gains. Specifically, the return volatility rises from 0.2 percentage points higher for the portfolio with the smallest gains to 1.9 percentage points higher for the next quartile to 2.6 percentage points higher for the next largest quartile to 3.0 percentage points higher for the portfolio with the largest gains. The coefficient estimates are only significant for the two quartiles with the largest gains (five percent level). Once again, the probability that the quartile estimates would increase monotonically with the size of the gains by chance is less than five percent.
Overall, the cross-sectional results for both losses in Table 6 and gains in Table 7 add confidence to our prior inferences that the 1997 capital gains tax rate reduction increased stock return volatility.
In summary, the empirical results documented above suggest that, after the capital gains tax rate reduction, the non-dividend paying portfolio experienced a higher return volatility increase relative to the dividend-paying portfolio, portfolios with larger losses experienced higher return volatility increases relative to the portfolios with smaller losses, and portfolios with larger gains experienced higher return volatility increases relative to the portfolios with smaller gains.
Next, we test whether the higher volatility increases between different portfolios are statistically significant. We apply equation (6) to the above pair-wise portfolios to test the significance of difference in return volatility increases. Table 8 reports the results of these hypothesis tests. Panel A shows the result of the return volatility increase in the non-dividend paying portfolio relative to that of the dividend-paying portfolio. According to equation (6), the dividend-paying portfolio is the benchmark portfolio indexed by "b"
and the non-dividend paying portfolio is the alternative portfolio indexed by "h". The interaction term HVP Post × is positive and statistically significant at the 10 percent test level. Further, the coefficient estimate suggests that the non-dividend paying portfolio experiences 1.7 percentage points higher return volatility than the dividend-paying portfolio after the capital gains tax cut. Panel B shows the return volatility increase of the non-dividend paying portfolio relative to the high dividend yield portfolio. Consistent with our prediction, the estimated coefficient for the interaction term HVP Post × is positive and higher at 1.8 percentage points and also significant at 10 percent test level.
To test if the return volatility increase is significantly higher for the large losses portfolio relative to the small losses portfolio, we use the small losses portfolio as the benchmark portfolio and the large losses portfolio as the alternative portfolio. Panel C
shows the estimation result. The interaction term HVP Post × is positive and statistically significant at the 5 percent test level. The estimated coefficient indicates that the largest losses portfolio experiences a 3.3 percentage points higher return volatility increase than the smallest losses portfolio after the capital gains tax cut. Finally, we test if the large gains portfolio experiences a higher return volatility increase than the small gains portfolio by using the later as the benchmark portfolio and the former as the alternative portfolio. The estimated coefficient for the interaction term HVP Post × is positive at 1.4, though insignificant. As a robustness check, we use the prior 12 and 24 month price changes to calculate the embedded gains and losses and form portfolios. We find the untabulated results are qualitatively similar.
Investor ownership and the effect of a capital gains tax cut on return volatility
The capital gains rate reduction in the TRA97 is only applied to income that is reported on personal tax returns, i.e., capital gains from the selling of shares held directly by individuals or held indirectly by individuals in flow-through entities, such as mutual funds, partnerships, trusts, S corporations, or limited liability corporations that pass income to investors' personal tax returns. Capital gains taxes are not levied on taxdeferred accounts (e.g., qualified retirement plans, including pensions, IRAs and 401(k)), tax-exempt organizations, and foreigners. Corporations pay capital gains taxes; however, the rate reduction in TRA97 did not apply to corporations. Thus, portfolios of stocks with more tax sensitive investor ownership may experience higher return volatility than portfolios of stocks with less tax sensitive investor ownership. We now examine if investor ownership has additional effect on the return volatility increase associated with the capital gains tax cut. To achieve this objective, we use a measure of individual difference is statistically significant. We infer that these tests provide no evidence that the increase in stock return volatility varied cross-sectionally with the individual ownership as a proxy for the tax-sensitivity of the stockholders.
These results suggest that high individual investor ownership does not contribute to higher stock return volatility in the event of a capital gains tax rate cut. There are several possible explanations for this failure to reject the null hypothesis. First, from a theoretical perspective, as long as the marginal investor of a stock is tax sensitive, the stock return volatility will respond to a capital gains tax change, regardless of the percentage of individual investor ownership on the stock. Second, the individual investor ownership may not be a good proxy for the tax sensitive ownership because of measurement error. Third, individual investors are subject to the "disposition effect" and may not be tax-savvy. Finally, the fact that idiosyncratic volatility increases in institutional ownership (Gompers and Metrick (2001) and Xu and Malkiel (2003) ) may mean that our institutional ownership measure is confounded by non-tax effects and thus a poor measure of tax-sensitive stock ownership.
Conclusion
We analyze the effect of capital gains taxes on the volatility of stock returns. Our analysis predicts that reducing capital gains taxes increases the stock return volatility because a capital gains tax cut reduces the risk sharing role of financial markets between investors and the government. The effect of a capital gains tax change on stock return volatility varies depending upon dividend distribution and the size of the embedded capital gains and losses. Using the Tax Relief Act of 1997, we empirically test the predictions on the stock return volatility of a capital gains tax cut. Our empirical analysis provides strong support for the predictions of our analysis for both the return volatility of the market index, the implied volatility of Standard & Poors index options, industry portfolios, and the cross-sectional implications for individual stock return volatility. Nonor lower dividend-paying stocks experience a larger increase in return volatility than high dividend-paying stocks, and stocks with large embedded capital gains or losses show a larger increase in return volatility after a capital gains tax rate reduction than stocks with small embedded capital gains or losses.
While a capital gains tax cut increases stock return volatility, investors are not necessarily worse off. From investors' perspective, the expected investment opportunities or the risk and return trade-off are the key consideration for long-term investment decisions. A capital gains tax cut may also increase investors' after-tax stock return leading to better risk and return trade-off. In this case, investors may benefit from a capital gains tax cut. It is interesting to see the effect of a capital gains tax cut on the risk and return trade-off on stock investment. We leave this for future research. 
Table 2 Summary Statistics for Constructed Portfolios
Panel A reports the monthly average of daily returns and monthly volatility for non-dividend paying, dividend-paying, low dividend yield, and high dividend yield portfolios constructed based on whether a firm pays dividends and the magnitude of dividend yield in the past year. We only include stocks with price changes (gains or losses) in the prior 18 months being less than 5 percent. r is the monthly average of daily return for month t. σ is the monthly volatility at month t. We use the subscript "ND" to represent the non-dividend paying portfolio, "D" for the dividend paying portfolio, "LY" for the low dividend yield portfolio (with dividend yield in the lower 50 percentile), and "HY" for the high dividend yield portfolio 
